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ABSTRACT  Notwithstanding elite opposition to referendums as inconsistent with 
theories of representative democracy, the 27-nation European Election Study finds 
that 63 percent of EU citizens want a vote on EU treaties. One explanation is that the 
majority want more popular participation in politics; another is that referendums are 
demanded by those negative about the performance of their governors at national 
and EU levels; a third is that demand is higher where referendums are part of the 
national context. Multi-level statistical analysis shows greater support for the 
hypotheses that citizens dissatisfied with government performance are more likely to 
want referendums to check their governors and that national context matters. 
However, dissatisfied EU citizens are a minority; most who endorse EU referendums 
are actually pro-EU. This lowers the risk of defeat if the EU consulted its citizens in a 
pan-European referendum. 
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Introduction 
The popular election of representatives is a necessary condition of a political system 
being democratically accountable. Periodic elections are deemed sufficient to hold 
representatives accountable (see Qvortrup, 2005) and many contributions to this 
symposium regard increasing the involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs 
as the appropriate means of strengthening democracy within the EU. Within the 
European Union, less than half of its members require national referendums (C2D, 
2011; Altman, 2011). There is no reference to referendums in the index of Dahl's 
(1989) overview of democracy. The American Constitution makes no provision for 
federal referendums and less than half of American states do so (see Stanley and 
Niemi, 2008: 313). Switzerland is egregious in the use of referendums (Kriesi and 
Trechsel, 2007). 
 A referendum is a vote on a specific issue of public policy, whereas 
parliamentary elections offer a broad brush choice. Voters endorse the party or 
representatives with a package of policies closest to their priorities, even though 
some may be inconsistent with their preferences. Alt and Alesina (1996: 659) note, 
µ7KHUHZLOODOZD\VEHDJHQF\ORVVHV
%\FRQWUDVWLQDUHIHUHQGXPYRWHUVGHFLGHWKH
outcome, even though governors decide the text on the ballot.1 Unlike deliberative 
democracy forums, which may not produce a clear cut outcome that is politically 
binding on government, a referendum can do so (Goodin, 2008). The result is: 
'Referendums disarm party elites' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 20). A referendum is 
GHPRFUDWLFLIWKHUHLVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKHHOHFWRUDWHPD\UHMHFWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
position; if not, the ballot is a plebiscite (Uleri, 2000). If a referendum result supports 
government policy, it may appear redundant, but this is not the case. It demonstrates 
majority commitment to a decision by representatives and losers as well as winners 
are expected to accept the outcome (cf. Anderson et al., 2005; Esaiasson, 2010). If a 
proposal is rejected, this supports the case for giving citizens a referendum veto 
because governors cannot be trusted to represent their views (Bowler et al., 2007).  
 The use of referendums in the European Union is contested (cf. Setälä, 2009; 
Maduz, 2010). The opposition is strongest from those who see themselves as 
trustees of the collective interest of all Europeans and those committed to the 
IRXQGHUVJRDORIDQHYHUFORVHU8QLRQ-HDQ0RQQHWWKRXJKWLWµZURQJWR
  
consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a Community of which they had 
no practical experience'. The current President of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, argues that to have important EU issues decided by a vote of 
uninformed and uninterested electors would 'undermine the Europe we are trying to 
build by simplifying important and complex subjects' (Hobolt, 2009: 23). Most critics 
of the democratic deficit contributing papers to this symposium call for more 
representative democracy, (e.g. Bellamy, Cooper, Lord and Pollak). Proponents of 
participatory democracy justify referendums as increasing the opportunity for citizens 
to be involved in making political decisions (Pateman, 1970, 2012; Hobolt, 2009: 
242ff). 
  This article shifts attention to the empirical level. Notwithstanding the 
collection opposition of elites at the EU level, a big majority of member states have 
held one or more national referendums on EU issues. Moreover, the 2009 European 
Election Study shows that a clear majority of (XURSH¶V FLWL]HQV WKLQN WKDW
referendums ought to be held on treaties about European integration. We test 
hypotheses about why there is substantial popular support for EU referendums. 
 
The Supply and Demand for European Union Referendums 
7KH0DDVWULFKW7UHDW\¶VVWDWHPHQWLQ$UWLFOHWKDWµWKH8QLRQVKDOOEHIRXQGHGRQ
representative democracy' makes the EU distinctive among intergovernmental 
organizations in having a popularly elected parliament with significant institutional 
powers. It also supports the view that elected representatives do not require having 
their decisions checked by referendums. Because EU decisions are made in multi-
national institutions, there is much more potential for agency loss between national 
electorates and decision makers than in national politics (Rose and Borz, 2013). 
 The principle set out in Article 10.3 of the Treaty of the European Union-
'decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen¶± is 
interpreted as being met by the European Parliament. A proposal for the Constitution 
for Europe to be ratified by a pan-European referendum was explicitly rejected by the 
non-elected Constitutional Convention (Castiglione et al., 2007). The Lisbon Treaty's 
authorization of a Citizens' Initiative shows the EU's rejection of direct popular 
  
engagement in EU policymaking. Unlike initiatives in national political systems, the 
EU Initiative does not trigger a vote. Instead, a valid Initiative petition only requires 
the European Commission to make a formal response to the issue that is raised. 
0RUHRYHUWKH7UHDW\¶VHQGRUVHPHQWRIdecision making by consensus (Article 15.4) 
implicitly rejects referendums, since any free and fair vote will necessarily reveal a 
division of public opinion. 
 Members of the European Parliament oppose referendums. The EU Profiler 
data base of party positions on EU referendums (Trechsel and Mair, 2009) found 
that 45 percent of MEPs were elected on national programmes that explicitly 
opposed holding referendums on EU issues and an additional 20 percent on 
programmes that took no position. Only 35 percent of MEPs were positive. This is 
consistent not only with theories of representative democracy but also with the 
interest of MEPs in wanting to avoid a challenge to their claim to be the exclusive 
voice of Europe's citizens.   
 National governments supply referendums. There is a conflict between the 
collective opposition to referendums in Brussels and the behaviour of national 
governments. The subsidiarity principle recognizes that national governments can 
call referendums on EU issues. Although there is no treaty obligation to call a 
referendum on an EU treaty, 22 member states have nonetheless done so since 
1972.2 Since the adoption of an EU treaty requires the unanimous approval of 
member states, a referendum in a single country is in effect a European referendum, 
since a defeat in one country is a veto of adoption. By contrast, referendums in 
American states and Swiss cantons do not put national policies in jeopardy nor do 
constitutional amendments require unanimity (cf. Tierney, 2012: chapter 6). 
  Whether a referendum is held can reflect a variety of rationales. A national 
government can invoke the logic of appropriateness to justify asking citizens to give 
their consent to a measure of constitutional importance (Closa, 2007: 1316, 1321; 
March and Olsen, 2006). A decision to call an EU referendum can be a tactical tool 
of a government seeking partisan advantage against the opposition or a means of 
escaping from partisan divisions within itself (Dür and Mateo, 2011: Setälä and 
Schiller, 2009; Altman, 2011). Ireland and Denmark are excep
  
constitutional obligations to hold EU referendums on the grounds that they alter the 
FRXQWU\¶V QDWLRQDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ 6LQFH 11 a British Act of Parliament requires a 
referendum on any further transfer of power to Brussels. A national government can 
use the prospect of a referendum to seek concessions in Brussels on the grounds 
that this will help ensure passage, a tactic that Irish governments have used to 
secure the reversal of a No vote in the first of a pair of referendums.  
 National referendums invariably show that voters divide in their views about 
EU measures; an average of 57 percent are in favour and 43 percent against. This 
average is greater than the percentage electing 21 of the national governments that 
endorsed the Lisbon Treaty; the British government that did so had won only 35 
percent of the national vote (Rose, 2013: Figure 4.1). Of the 40 referendums held 
since 1972, 31 showed a majority approving an EU measure, while 9 rejected a 
measure that their national government had endorsed at the EU level. When 
Denmark's voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty and when Irish voters rejected the 
Nice and Lisbon treaties, EU officials were unwilling to accept defeat. Instead, the 
EU gave concessions to national governments that led to second referendums 
producing majorities in favour. However, rejection of the Constitution for Europe by a 
majority of French and Dutch referendum votes in 2005 has made EU policymakers 
anxious to avoid referendums. 
 Whatever the outcome, the selectivity of national referendums on EU issues 
creates gross inequalities between EU citizens, because a big majority is not allowed 
to vote on a treaty since their national government does not call a referendum 
(Figure 1). In the extreme case of the Lisbon and Nice treaties, 99 percent of EU 
citizens did not have a chance to register a vote and 97 percent had no chance of 
voting on the Single European Act or the Amsterdam treaty. Although holding votes 
on the Constitution for Europe in four countries increased the size of the minority 
given a voice, 73 percent of EU citizens did not have a referendum in which they 
could register their views. Whereas the requirement of unanimity means that a 
referendum vote in only one country can affect the whole of the EU, referendums in 
American states and Swiss cantons do not put national policies in jeopardy. 
 
  
 )LJXUH([FOXVLRQRI(XURSH¶V&LWL]HQVE\ National Referendums) 
 
Popular Demand 
In the weeks following the June, 2009 European Parliament election, the European 
Election Study (EES) conducted nationally representative sample surveys in each of 
the EU's 27 member states. A total of 27,069 respondents were asked: Should EU 
treaty changes be decided by referendum? (see www.piredeu.eu). Since EU treaties 
are similar to constitutional amendments, the question focuses on a critical meta-
rule: How should decisions be taken about expanding the powers of the European 
Union? Because the question is independent of a specific treaty, respondents are 
not primed to give an answer that reflects their views about a particular European 
issue or about membership in the EU.  
 A substantial majority of EES respondents, 63 percent, are positive about 
referendums, including 26 percent who strongly agree. By contrast 18 percent are 
against, but only 4 percent take the Brussels view of strong opposition to 
referendums A total of 19 percent have no opinion either way. Thus, there is more 
than a three and one-half to one majority in favour of referendums on EU treaties. 
This substantial majority is consistent with national surveys asking citizens about 
referendums on national political issues (Bowler et al., 2007: 352). 
 Support for referendums extends across the whole of Europe: the chief 
difference between countries is in the size of the national majority. In Ireland, Greece 
and the United Kingdom, more than 80 percent endorsed a referendum and in 25 of 
27 member states an absolute majority of respondents was in favour. The size of the 
majority endorsing a referendum is more likely to be reduced by an above-average 
percentage of don't knows than by large-scale opposition. In Sweden and Slovenia, 
where endorsement is lowest, there are nonetheless pluralities of 45 and 41 percent 
in favour of referendums.  
 Since a survey question is hypothetical, replies may exaggerate demand. 
Turnout at actual European referendums provides an indication of the extent to 
which action matches words (see LeDuc, 2003: 170f). In 20 referendums in countries 
that were already members of the European Union when a ballot was held, turnout 
  
has averaged 66.1 percent. Consistent with theories that turnout should be higher at 
first-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), in the immediately preceding national 
election turnout was 10 percentage points higher on average. However, by 
comparison with the national turnout at the immediately preceding European 
Parliament election, average turnout at an EU referendum was more than 12 
percentage points higher. 
 
Theories of Why Citizens Want Referendums 
Normative theories justifying or rejecting referendums have empirical implications. 
Theories that make popular participation a major desideratum of democracy imply 
that individuals who participate in politics or have the resources to do so will be more 
likely to favour referendums. An alternative theory is that referendum demand comes 
from dissatisfied citizens who see referendums as a chance to impose checks on 
governors with whom they are dissatisfied. Bowler et al. (2007) describe participatory 
theories as offering an "engaged" motivation for favouring referendums, while 
dissatisfaction with institutional performance creates an "enraged" motivation (see 
also, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). The multi-national character of the European 
Union makes differences in national context potentially relevant. In countries where 
national referendums are held, they may be seen as suitable for EU measures too 
and citizens enraged by their national government may take out their ire on the EU.  
 Political participation is the result of a socialization process in which 
individuals acquire socio-economic resources and predispositions to political 
engagement. Empirical research consistently finds that people with more socio-
economic resources, such as education, income and social status, are more likely to 
participate in politics (Nevitte et al., 2009). Inglehart (1990) has theorized that the 
(8¶VFRPSOH[DQGUHPRWHFKDUDFWHUUHTXLUHVHven more education for individuals to 
participate. Since older people have had more time to become familiar with politics, 
age should also encourage more support for referendums (see e.g. Plutzer, 2002). 
 A disposition to endorse political participation, including referendums, can 
also be driven by interest in politics. Brady et al. (1995: 283) emphasize the 
importance of interest in politics independent of socio-economic resources. However, 
  
Almond and Verba (1963: 77ff, 180ff) caution that many people high in resources do 
not bother to  participate because politicians are trusted to act as agents responsive 
to the wishes of  better educated and economically better off citizens (cf. Lijphart, 
1997). Thus: 
H 1  PARTICIPATION. The more inclined individuals are to participate in 
politics, the more likely they are to favour EU referendums.  
  
 Theories of representative democracy postulate that as long as citizens are 
satisfied with the performance of their government, then referendums are not needed 
to check what trusted governors do. This theory is consistent with Jean Monnet's 
(1978) policy of furthering European integration though politically invisible small-
scale increments of policy that claimed a 'permissive consensus' from citizens who 
were neither engaged nor enraged (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 41). However, 
the eurozone crisis has made the impact of EU policies very visible, distributing costs 
as well as benefits. 
 Referendums offer citizens dissatisfied with government performance an 
effective means of rejecting decisions taken by governors whom they do not see as 
representing their views. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 227) argue that citizens 
who do not want to be engaged in conventional politics 'feel that they need to be 
involved, even though they would rather not be' in order to check unsatisfactory 
governors. Moreover, they theorize that individuals low in socio-economic resources 
favour referendums as giving them the opportunity to veto decisions made by 
policymakers representing more resourceful electors. 
 In the multi-level European political system, the performance of government 
can be evaluated at both the national and the European levels. Reif and Schmitt's 
(1980; Hix and Marsh, 2011) model of public opinion stresses that national politics is 
of first-order importance, because it provides shortcuts for understanding remote 
second-order issues arising at the EU level. Individuals dissatisfied with the 
performance of their national government or national economic situation can project 
their feelings onto EU institutions (cf. Duch and Stevenson, 2008: 157ff). However, a 
referendum on an EU issue increases the potential second-order effect of EU 
  
performance (Glencross and Trechsel, 2011). The more confidence individuals have 
in how the EU performs, the less they should feel the need for referendums, while 
citizens against European integration should endorse referendums as offering a 
means of stopping moves toward an ever closer Union.  
H 2.  EVALUATION OF POLITICAL PERFORMANCE. The less satisfied 
individuals are with the performance of the EU or their national government, 
the more likely they are to favour EU referendums. 
 
 Differences among member states in the requirement for referendums on 
major national issues may influence whether individuals regard a referendum as a 
normal method of deciding major EU issues (Closa, 2007). If a country's MEPs differ 
about having EU referendums, their debate can break the elite spiral of silence about 
popular review of EU decisions and boost popular demand for a referendum (Dür 
and Mateo, 2011: 488f). There are substantial cross-national variations in the 
percentage of MEPs committed to EU referendums, ranging from 0 in four countries 
to 100 percent in Portugal.  
 Indirectly, the performance of national government may create distrust of 
national governors responsible for representing their citizens in EU discussions. 
Corruption is a major source of distrust; therefore, citizens in countries where the 
government is more corrupt are more likely to be enraged and demand a referendum 
check on what their nominal representatives agree to in Brussels. There are big 
differences in the extent of corruption in the governments of EU member states. On 
the 10-point Transparency international Corruption Perception Index, at the time of 
the 2009 EP election Denmark and Sweden were both placed above 9, while 
Bulgaria and Romania were as low as 3.8 and Italy and Greece were almost as low 
(www.transparency.org). 
H 3  CONTEXT. The more national context favours referendums, the more 
likely individuals are to favour EU referendums. 
 
Testing Hypotheses about the Demand for Referendums  
  
In forming their political opinions, individuals are subject to stimuli evaluated 
according to the prior political dispositions and cognitive capacities (Zaller, 1992: 
42ff). Because we want to take both individual and contextual influences into 
account, multi-level modelling (MLM) is an appropriate statistic. Given the ordinal 
distribution of our dependent variable, the STATA gllamm function is used to 
estimate an ordered logit model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008; Gelman and 
Hill, 2007). Since the EES sample has 27,069 respondents, we focus on variables 
with a significance level of better than .00. Details of the distribution and coding of 
independent variables are given in the Appendix table.  
 
Participatory Influences Not as Expected  
Although characteristics that encourage individuals to participate in national politics 
significantly affect the demand for EU referendums, the direction of influence 
sometimes differs from that predicted in hypothesis 1. Instead of social class 
encouraging a demand for more participation, higher status individuals are less likely 
WR HQGRUVH UHIHUHQGXPV &RQVLVWHQW ZLWK /LMSKDUW¶V  H[SHFWDWLRQV LW DSSHDUV
that people above average in status appear more confident of their representatives 
doing what they want without a referendum check. The tendency of those lower in 
class to want a referendum check on governors is consistent with the Hibbing-Theiss 
(2002) theory that referendums are favoured by those who feel under-represented 
through parliamentary elections. None of the other measures of socio-economic 
resources±education, standard of living, age or gender-- has a significant direct 
effect on attitudes toward a referendum (Table 1).  
 
   Table 1 about here Participation and Performance  
 
 Indicators of political engagement do support the participation hypothesis. 
People more interested in politics are more in favour of referendums and this is also 
the case of those socialized to identify with a party (Table 1). However, the 
interaction of education and political interest has a significant negative effect.  
Education moderates the predisposition of politically interested people to favour 
  
referendums, apparently on the grounds that educated people are more prepared to 
trust representatives to think as they do. Conversely, politically interested citizens 
with less education are, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue, significantly more likely 
to want the right to vote on treaties. The quarter of citizens who view the EU as 
having an effect on their country's most important political problem are more inclined 
to want referendums in order to hold Brussels accountable. On the other hand, 
identification with Europe encourages people to feel that Brussels does represent 
them and referendums are less needed. These findings qualify conventional theories 
of resources and political interest encouraging electoral participation in national 
elections (cf. Brady et al., 1995; Nevitte et al., 2009). This may be due to 
referendums being about issues rather than party or candidate-focussed. 
 
Dissatisfaction with performance drives demand  
In Europe's multi-level political system citizens have a choice of governments to be 
satisfied or dissatisfied with. National governments can be held to account for their 
performance at the European level and vice versa. As predicted in hypothesis 2, 
government performance at both levels has a significant effect on referendum 
demand. The more dissatisfied people are with their national government, the 
readier they are to endorse referendums that enable them to challenge treaties 
approved by governors that lack their confidence. In a complementary manner, 
individuals who voted for the governing party are more likely to accept decisions at 
the EU level without a referendum. Even though the EES survey was conducted 
after the 2008 economic crisis had erupted, the state of the national economy had no 
significant direct effect on referendum demand. Since an individual's standard of 
living also lacks a significant effect, this gives strong support to the view that 
attitudes toward EU referendums do not reflect economic performance but 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with political performance. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that citizens dissatisfied with the EU ought to be readier 
to express their rage by rejecting EU treaties at referendums, and this receives 
statistical support. People who lack confidence in the EU's governors taking 
decisions in the interests of their country are significantly more likely to favour 
  
referendums. Likewise, the more people are dissatisfied with the existing level of 
democracy in the EU, the readier they are to endorse referendums. Since an EU 
treaty advances European integration, those more opposed to an ever closer Union 
are readier to want the check of a referendum.   
 
Context matters too 
After controlling for the effect of differences found within every country, differences in 
national context also have an effect on referendum demand (Table 1). When a 
national government appears corrupt, this significantly encourages popular demand 
for referendums as a check on an untrustworthy government. In addition, national 
corruption has an interaction effect with individual dissatisfaction with government, 
thereby giving an additional boost to referendum demand. National politicians and 
institutions also have a significant effect in mobilizing support for referendums. If a 
FRXQWU\¶V0(3VEUHDN WKHVSLUDORIVLOHQFHDQG start demanding a referendum, this 
encourages more citizens to come out in favour of such a vote and has a positive 
LQWHUDFWLRQHIIHFWZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWLQDFRXQWU\¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQIRUUHIHUHQGXPVRQ
major national issues. The use of multiple indicators of context as well as individual-
level controls results in a national requirement for referendums not having a 
significant effect. 
 Given the very large sample size, there is support for all three of our 
hypotheses; however, the degree of support is not equal. A likelihood ratio test of the 
influence of different sets of indicators3 finds that the highest chi2 (df) value is given 
to hypothesis 2, especially from measures of EU performance and satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the national government. The very strong 
influence of EU performance suggests that first-order national influences on EU 
attitudes have declined since their importance was emphasized more than three 
decades ago by Reif and Schmitt (1980), at least as far as issue-oriented 
referendums are concerned. Moreover, the eurozone crisis has increased the 
national salience of EU performance, creating WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHµVOHHSLQJJLDQW¶RI
EU issues being roused in electing the European Parliament or national parliaments 
(Eijk and Franklin, 2007). The likelihood ratio tests also show some support for 
  
socio-economic resources and political engagement affecting the demand for 
referendums. However, this does not always occur as predicted by theories of 
participation, since pro-referendum citizens affected by rage at the performance of 
government tend to be lower in their capacity for participation. There is least support 
for the influence of context; within every member state attitudes toward referendums 
tend to be divided, with the foregoing influences accounting for within-nation 
differences of opinion.   
 Consistent with referendums offering a check on governors, referendum 
demand is stronger among enraged than engaged citizens (cf. Bowler et al., 2007). 
People who do not identify with Europe, have low confidence in EU decisions, and 
see it as having a democratic deficit are more likely to favour referendums that can 
check further advances toward an ever closer Union. While this appears to support 
the Brussels fear of involving unsympathetic European citizens in decisions about 
the future of the EU, the fear is exaggerated, because those unsympathetic with the 
EU are a minority of European citizens. A majority in favour of more integration also 
endorse referendums. Altogether, 39 percent of those favouring a referendum 
endorse increased integration, 33 percent are against further integration, and 28 
percent are undecided. If a referendum is held, the median voter is likely to be 
undecided about whether an ever closer Union is in principle desirable or 
undesirable, and open to evaluating the specifics of the issues at stake in a given 
ballot.  
 
Dynamic Implications  
 Whatever public opinion surveys say, EU policymakers would like to continue 
relying on the existing system of representation without the risk of the future rejection 
of a treaty arrived at after painstaking negotiations among governments representing 
member states. Since the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have legal 
obligations to hold a referendum before ratifying any new treaty, to sustain this 
SRVLWLRQ ZRXOG UHTXLUH FRQILQLQJ WKH (8¶V activities within the limits of powers 
conferred by existing treaties. The new economic powers approved to deal with the 
eurozone crisis have an ambiguous status: they are set out in a document described 
  
as a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.4 Its section 16 declares that 
'within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty' necessary steps 
will be taken to 'incorporate the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of 
the European Union'. A referendum in one or more countries appears unavoidable in 
the medium term; doing so under existing practices would raise issues about equality 
among EU citizens. 
  
Unanimity and Inequality in a Multi-National EU 
In a national referendum every citizen has the right to vote. However, in the EU 
today the few percent living in countries have a vote on multi-national EU treaties 
and the unanimity requirement means that this small minority determines the 
outcome for up to 99 percent with no vote.  A unanimity rule is not required to amend 
a national constitution. The norm is to require some kind of super or concurring 
majority of legislative chambers, federal partners or citizens. 
 It would be possible to finesse the unanimity requirement by making provision 
for enhanced cooperation, an existing EU procedure in which a substantial number 
of member states agree to cooperate for stated ends, but those that do not wish to 
do so opt out (Piris, 2012). Thus, if an EU measure was rejected in one or more 
national referendums, a national majority would be respected by the country being 
allowed to opt out of its provisions, while enhanced cooperation would proceed 
among countries where a majority approved (Koelliker, 2006).  
 The dynamic consequences of enhanced co-operation for European 
integration depend on whether divisions are temporary or permanent (Rose, 2013: 
FKDSWHU  7KH (8¶V RIILFLDO JORVVDU\ PLVWDNHQO\ GHVFULbes the variable geometry 
that initially results from enhanced co-RSHUDWLRQ DV FUHDWLQJ µLUUHFRQFLODEOH¶
differences separating member states 
(www.europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary). However, divisions are temporary 
if there are leaders and laggards. Should the initiative of leaders in enhanced co-
operation appear successful, laggards can catch up and adopt an enhance policy to. 
What originally appeared as a two-speed Europe then becomes a Union in which all 
member states have sooner or later moved together. The conversion of EFTA 
  
members into EU members is an example of catching up, while the eurozone crisis 
has re-enforced the division of Europe into multiple currency zones. 
 
Promoting Equality 
Current practice within the EU creates gross inequalities between those of its 
citizens allowed to vote on treaties and those that are not. Since the EU lacks the 
power to prevent a national government from calling a referendum, the only way to 
give every European citizen the right to vote would be to hold a pan-European 
referendum on each new treaty. Consistent with the EU's use of super-majorities and 
rules for amending national constitutions, a positive EU outcome could require a 
concurring majority of the electorate and of member states. This principle is often 
found in federal systems (Rose, 2012) and is consistent with the logical of individuals 
being both national and European citizens. 
 The EU regards endorsement by national governments as a surrogate form of 
endorsement by national citizens; however, surrogate endorsement is a very weak 
source of popular commitment. The strongest form of popular commitment is that 
conferred by a popular vote. A referendum can increase commitment by encouraging 
national governments and parties in favour of an ever closer union to campaign for 
popular support for European integration. Because a referendum involves a 
sustained campaign about an issue, electors with no strongly held views or 
knowledge about the EU are more likely to change their minds in the light of 
campaign information (see Kriesi, 2012; Hobolt, 2007: chapter 7). If a turnout of 50 
percent was required for a referendum to be authoritative, it would prod groups in 
favour of EU integration to campaign more actively than in a European Parliament 
election, where turnout was 43 percent in 2009. If past patterns persist, most EU 
referendums would show a majority in favour of further integration. 
 A basic premise of a democratic vote is that losers as well as winners should 
DFFHSWWKHRXWFRPH$QGHUVRQHWDO/RVHUV¶FRQVHQWLVDEVHQWZKHQQDWLRQDO
referendums are held selectively, since citizens of up to two dozen states have no 
right to vote. A treaty endorsed by a majority of voters and countries would have a 
far better claim to popular commitment than an Economic Stability Treaty negotiated 
  
at the elite level and with a strong technocratic component. Likewise, a treaty that 
could not gain support from most of Europe's citizens should force EU policymakers 
to ask themselves why they are out of touch with the citizens whom they are meant 
to represent. 
 
  
Notes 
 
1. An Initiative is different from a referendum because the decision to call a vote 
and the text of the question is determined by whoever organizes the initiative 
(see Setälä and Schiller, 2012). 
2. In addition, Norway has held two referendums in which voters rejected EU 
membership and Switzerland six about association with the EU. 
3. Details available from the authors. 
4. A cognate word for treaty is used in other official languages except German, 
which describes the document ambiguously as a vertrag (treaty or contract) or 
evasively as a pakt. 
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Table 1.  INFLUENCES ON POPULAR DEMAND FOR REFERENDUMS 
Source:  European Election Study 2009 www.piredeu.eu; Individual level N=27,069; 
Context level N=27. The ordered logit model was estimated using the gllamm 
command in Stata. 
  
 Coefficient Stand. Error P 
Hypothesis 1  PARTICIPATION 
Socio-Economic Resources    
Social class -.112 .015 .000 
Education -.007 .013 .584 
Standard of living .007 .016 .645 
Age -.002 .001 .010 
Female .000 .023 .999 
Political Engagement    
Interest in politics .457 .061 .000 
Interest in politics*education -.098 .017 .000 
Identifies with a party .113 .024 .000 
Identifies with Europe -.105 .024 .000 
EU handles most important problem .110 .026 .000 
    
Hypothesis 2  POLITICAL PERFORMANCE 
National Performance    
Dissatisfied government record .148 .038 .000 
Dissatisfied national economy -.004 .013 .738 
Voted for governing party -.071 .026 .006 
EU Performance    
Less confidence in EU decisions .109 .017 .000 
Dislikes EU integration .148 .014 .000 
Dissatisfied with democracy .213 .020 .000 
    
Hypothesis 3  NATIONAL CONTEXT 
Perception of corruption index .033 .010 .001 
National referendum required -.082 .043 .058 
National MEPs pro-referendum .008 .001 .000 
National referendum *MEPs pro-ref. .012 .001 .000 
Dissatisfied govt.* Corruption index .021 .006 .000 
    
log likelihood -37325.99   
Variance .06123274   
AIC 74703.98   
  
Appendix Table: LIST OF VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS 
 Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Decide treaty changes by referendum 1 5 3.67 1.11 
     
Hypothesis 1  PARTICIPATION 
Socio-Economic Resources     
Social class 1 3 2.37 0.85 
Education 0 5 3.30 1.32 
Standard of living 1 3 2.05 0.78 
Age 18 75 49.97 16.23 
Female 0 1 0.56 - 
Political Engagement     
Interest in politics 0 1 0.53 - 
Identifies with a party 0 1 0.54 - 
Identifies with Europe 0 1 0.57 - 
EU handles most important problem 0 1 0.24 - 
     
Hypothesis 2  POLITICAL PERFORMANCE 
National Performance     
Dissatisfied with government record 0 1 0.52 - 
Dissatisfied national economy 1 4 3.15 0.92 
Voted for governing party 0 1 0.30 - 
EU Performance     
Less confidence in EU decisions 1 4 2.60 0.75 
Dislikes EU integration 1 3 1.90 0.83 
Dissatisfied with democracy 1 4 2.63 0.71 
     
Hypothesis 3  NATIONAL CONTEXT 
National referendum required 0 1 0.37 -  
National MEPs pro-referendum 0 100 34.05 28.85 
Perception of corruption index (inverted) 0.7 6.2 3.64 1.79 
Notes:  Satisfied democracy scale averages responses for EU and national 
institutions. Perception of Corruption index 2009: Transparency International Index 
inverted so higher score is more corrupt. Transparency International, 
www.transparency.org. European Election Study (www.piredeu.eu). Individual 
respondents in 27 countries, 27,069.  
 
  
  
 
Notes: Lisbon: Ireland voted; 26 countries did not. European Constitution: France, 
Spain, Luxembourg and Netherlands voted, 21 did not. Amsterdam: Ireland and 
Denmark voted, 13 countries did not. Nice: Ireland voted, 14 countries did not. 
Maastricht: France, Ireland and Denmark voted, 9 countries did not. Single European 
Act: Denmark and Ireland voted, 10 countries did not.   
